Database audit records are important for investigating suspicious actions against transactional databases. Their admissibility as digital evidence depends on satisfying Chain of Custody (CoC) properties during their generation, collection and preservation in order to prevent their modification, guarantee action accountability, and allow third-party verification. However, their production has relied on auditing capabilities provided by commercial database systems which may not be effective if malicious users (or insiders) misuse their privileges to disable audit controls, and compromise their admissibility. Hence, in this paper, we propose a forensically-aware distributed database architecture that implements CoC properties as functional requirements to produce admissible audit records. The novelty of our proposal is the use of hybrid logical clocks, which compared with a previous centralised vector-clock architecture, has evident advantages as it (i) allows for more accurate provenance and causality tracking of insider actions, (ii) is more scalable in terms of system size, and (iii) although latency is higher (as expected in distributed environments), 70 per cent of user transactions are executed within acceptable latency intervals.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, research about the efficient design of computing architectures for processing secure database transactions was already proposed as part of OS kernel extensions [1] . Currently, user applications and software development needs, have evolved these controls from obscure kernel primitives to user-accessible audit functionality in commercial transactional databases [2] [3] in order to secure distributed transaction processing. Conversely, when security of such transactions is compromised, database forensics has emerged as a reactive approach to investigate (obtain, analyse and present in court) digital evidence about the attribution of actions to malicious users [4] , which may not be fully compatible when dealing with complex database structures [5] . Instead, a proactive approach for the generation, collection and preservation of database audit records seems more suitable for capturing the occurrence of events (DML operations 1 ) during the normal operation of a forensicallyaware database architecture [6] . Particularly, for making these audit records forensically admissible as digital evidence, this approach enforces Chain of Custody (CoC) properties [7] as (1) role segregation to prevent their modification, (2) capturing provenance of every event performed on transactional data, (3) event ordering in a timeline for explaining their causality and allowing third-party verification, and (4) ensuring these properties remain active during the architecture's normal operation. However, if malicious users (insiders) misuse their privileges [8] in order to disable any audit functionality and compromise a transactional database, CoC properties are affected, making any audit records inadmissible as evidence. Therefore, in this paper, we propose, deploy and evaluate a forensically-aware distributed database architecture designed to handle suspicious DML operations when insiders misuse their credentials to alter a database state without being detected. This novel architecture is based on hybrid logical clocks (HLC), first proposed in [9] , but implementing CoC properties at its core to support the generation, collection and preservation of audit records, having a transactional and a forensic database residing on separate servers. As opposed to a previous centralised vectorclock (VC) based architecture [6] , an experimental deployment of our proposal shows that (i) provenance and causality tracking is indeed more accurate, preventing inconsistent observations since concurrent and sequential events are timelined using synchronised physical clocks (ii) timestamps are node and audit table independent, making it more scalable in terms of system size and (iii) although higher latency is expected due to its distributed deployment, around 70 per cent of user transactions will incur within acceptable latency intervals. The rest of the article is outlined as follows. In Section II, research background and related work is provided, followed by an explanation of both system and attack models in Section III. Next, in Section IV, we explain the architecture's formal specification, having role segregation, provenance, timelining and causality as CoC properties [6] . Then, in sections V and VI, we deploy and evaluate the architecture performance. Finally, conclusions about our current and future work are given in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The malicious insider threat against information [10] [11] [12] stored in databases urges the development of alternative solutions with auditing capabilities within distributed architectures even in the presence of an insider adversary. Although, such architectures have been already proposed [1] [13] [14] [15] [16] , none of them considered Chain of Custody (CoC) properties and their implication in the admissibility of audit records as digital evidence. Our current research is focused on the design and deployment of such an architecture, based on previous work developed in [6] , where a vector-clock (VC) mechanism [17] was used for tracking DML operations' provenance and causality, producing audit records within a forensically-ready database architecture. Nonetheless, beyond the evident scalability issue between the VC timestamp size and the number of audit tables, this mechanism also introduced precision issues and uncertain causal observations [18] because these are designed to enable operation ordering rather than, in fact, determining the actual physical time of their occurrence. Conversely, recent work in the field of multi-version databases such as Google's Spanner [19] , Cockroach DB [9] and Yesquel [20] has inspired our current work with the introduction of a Hybrid-Logical-Clock (HLC) mechanism which extends the functionality of vector clocks by using synchronised system clocks for calculating accurate timestamps of audit records. As a result, both the scalability and uncertainty problem of VC can be solved since our HLC-based proposal employs more accurate timestamp calculations to build a timeline for analysing the causality of audit records during their generation, collection and preservation.
III. MODELS
We now present the models assumed in this work.
A. System Model
Our proposed architecture comprises a transactional (N DB ) and a forensic (F DB ) database for the generation, collection and preservation of admissible audit records. We assume N DB and F DB to be sets of database tables and audit tables, respectively, being each N DB horizontally fragmented so that the architecture can scale to include more than one node (a pair N DB , F DB ) if required. Each database table T i ∈ N DB has a corresponding audit table F i ∈ F DB . The execution of the j th DML operation (insert, update or delete) in a table T i ∈ N DB initiates the generation, collection and preservation of an audit record e j i in the corresponding audit table F i ∈ F DB . For maintaining consistency and atomicity in databases, not only for audit records, but also the resulting timeline, conservative 2-phase locking [21] is implemented as a single transactional block from the generation of DML operations at N DB to the collection and preservation of audit records at F DB . We also assume that each node have forensic controllers for the accurate timestamping and sequencing of the records.
B. Attack Model
An insider adversary model is considered [10] [22] , assuming insiders misusing their access credentials to N DB . Insiders interact with N DB using low-privilege (DB usr ), or highprivilege (DB adm ) roles. The first is for data entry purposes only whilst the second is a high-privilege role for managing N DB and its stored data. We assume that an insider can use the assigned DB adm role to access N DB , and execute DML operations to modify or impersonate other insiders with low privilege access (DB usr ). Insiders can execute DML operations against any database table in N DB , the actions of which can be monitored by a forensic role (DB for ) exclusively reserved for accessing audit records and their timeline in F DB . As insiders are not trusted, we require that DB adm = DB for to prevent insiders from conveniently disabling forensic functionality. We also assume no collusion between a DB adm and a DB for .
IV. FORMALISING THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
To detect malicious insider actions within our proposed architecture, Chain-of-Custody (CoC) must be enforced, requiring the following important properties as defined in [6] : (i) role segregation, (ii) DML operation provenance, (iii) event timelining and (iv) causality. As a result, audit records can be used as digital evidence to attribute malicious insider actions against a transactional database N DB .
A. Role Segregation:
In the next definitions, a clear separation of duties is established, abstracting the forensic functionality to N DB users whilst preventing F DB users to interfere with the normal operations of N DB .
Definition IV.3. Database Table: A database table T i is a sequence of entries d k i , representing the k th entry in table T i :
Definition IV.4. Audit Table: An audit table is a sequence of audit records e j i , representing the j th DML operation in table T i :
Then, a function corr maps the current state of a database table
Definition IV.5. Database Roles: Let R be a 3-element set denoting database roles such that:
Both roles DB usr and DB adm enable insiders to interact with N DB to perform regular operations (data entry) or administrative functions (data management), respectively. Meanwhile, DB for is a role exclusively assigned to forensic users who can access F DB to monitor suspicious insider actions if required.
(a) Audit records e j i in a VC timeline T ι. At time pt = 11 an inconsistent (dashed) cut could also be obtained, wrongfully suggesting that e 1 3 could have happened at pt = 10.
(b) Audit records e j i in a HLC timeline T ι. This mechanism solves VC inconsistency using a concurrency flag. E.g. 2 and 3 audit records have been certainly observed at pt = 10 and pt = 11, respectively Definition IV.6. Insider: Let I be a set of insiders who can interact with N DB , and perform DML operations in a table T i ∈ N DB . Then, a surjective function assgT o maps an insider u to only one database role r, preventing, for example, having forensic and administrative roles assigned to the same insider.
B. DML Operation Provenance
For accountability purposes, the following definitions allow capturing provenance information about interactions between insiders u and N DB . 
Here, provenance is tuple-size independent, allowing for more/less contextual information if required.
C. Audit Record Timelining
A timeline T ι is an accurate chronological record for explaining the occurrence of DML operations in a table T i ∈ N DB , and preserving the occurrence of their corresponding audit records, generated and collected in an audit table F i ∈ F DB . We use a Hybrid-Logical-Clock (HLC) mechanism to build T ι which is more scalable than its VC counterpart to support more nodes N DB , F DB if required, making it ideal for distributed fragmented or replicated databases. Furthermore, HLC produces consistent cuts at physical time p t (Fig.1b ) by introducing a concurrency flag for monitoring events on every observable time interval, solving the problem of inefficient causality tracking when using VC timestamps ( Fig.1a ).
Definition IV.9. Audit Record: When a DML operation O in a table T i ∈ N DB occurs, an audit record is created. Hence, an audit record e j i is a 3-tuple that captures the table state change from T i to T i with timestamp τ : 
a) If an entry d is inserted, an audit record e is appended to an audit 
A timestamp V m is a 4-tuple, such that: 
Notice that by means of composite functions colct and prsv we are enforcing conservative 2-phase locking during the generation, collection and preservation of audit records. This simply means that audit records cannot be preserved if their generation and collection are not executed in that order.
D. Event Causality
As mentioned before, using HLC to build a timeline offers evident advantages for designing an efficient distributed forensically-aware database architecture. We develop our current work based on the causality definitions and HLC implementation given in [9] . Unlike the VC causality definitions in [6] , their counterparts featured in our current work strengthen their HLC timestamp conditions because these cannot increase unboundedly, ending up recording audit records ahead of the timeline's physical time. Now, once audit records have been timelined, the index j used to trace their ordering within an audit table F i can be omitted so that audit records can be referred as e i being identifiable only by their HLC timestamp and the index of the audit table F i to which they belong.
Definition IV. 13 . Forensic Evidence Set: Audit records in T ι ∈ F DB are elements of an forensic evidence set E:
Causality in these audit records dictate that they are either sequential or concurrent, justifying their relationship by means of a "happen-before" relation ( hb − →). So when using hybrid logical clocks (HLC), from Eq. (10), e i .τ is 3-tuple recording the following time information [9] : Definition IV. 16 . Event Concurrency Property: The concurrency property applies to all audit records e i ∈ E recording DML operations generated in their corresponding tables T i ∈ N DB , which are not sequential with each other:
For audit records e j i ∈ F i to be used as digital evidence, Chain-of-Custody (CoC) must be initiated and maintained during their generation, collection and preservation within a forensically-aware database architecture. In Fig.2 , we implement an experimental architecture, based on the VC approach proposed in [6] , yet utilizing a HLC mechanism instead, similar to the one implemented by [9] . As a result, a timeline T ι of timestamps V n can be built to keep an audit trail of the occurrence of DML operations against N DB . The functional components of the experimental architecture are described as follows: (A) Concurrent DML Operation Generator: JMeter configured in Master-Slave mode. (B) Transactional (N DB ) and Forensic (F DB ) Databases:
Deployed in MSSQL Server 2014 in Linked Server mode and synchronised with an NTP-based time service. (C) Proactive Database Forensics Controllers: SQL C# triggers and stored procedures implemented as forensic controllers in both N DB and F DB . For better understanding, it is important to clarify the difference between architectural components and functional controllers in our research context. Whilst a component refers to an architectural element in charge of performing specific actions, a controller is a logical routine responsible for coordinating the behaviour of such components during the generation, collection and preservation of audit records. In the following subsections, the architecture's functional components, including the logic functionality of its forensic controllers, are explained in detail.
A. Concurrent DML Operation Generator
For simulating real user transactions, synthetic workload is generated by implementing a concurrent environment in which a set of n insiders ∈ I (Def.IV.6) can perform a number of DML operations against N DB using a specific administrative role (DB adm or DB us ) (Def.IV.5). Thus, for stressing the architecture, a Master Event Generator (MeGen) and three Client Event Generators (CeGen) are used, as shown in Fig.2.[sec. (A) ]. These generators are deployed using JMeter in master-slave mode, enabling us to open threaded database connections for sending concurrent DML operations to N DB .
B. Transactional and Forensic Databases
For preventing audit records to be tampered with due to potential malicious insider actions, role segregation (Section IV-A) is required so that audit and forensic activities can be performed in a transparent, yet efficient way. Unlike the centralised VC-based architecture in [6] , ours achieve this by distributing and physically segregating transactional and forensic operations using two different database servers, each hosting N DB and F DB with explicit operative (DB adm , DB us ) and forensic (DB for ) roles, respectively. For facilitating both the collection of audit records in each audit table F m , and the construction of the timeline T ι, F DB (Fig.3) is de-normalised. This ensures scalability in more complex environments where centralised architectures may not perform well [9] . 
C. Proactive Database Forensic Controllers
SQL CLR C# triggers and stored procedures are implemented as forensic controllers, and deployed in both N DB and F DB , beginning their execution when the Concurrent DML Operation Generator component sends threaded operations to N DB . These controllers, as depicted in Fig.2. [sec. (C)] are implemented following the formal specifications given in Section IV, allowing CoC to be initiated and maintained since the generation and collection of audit records until their preservation in the timeline T ι. As opposed to the VC architecture in [6] , the HLC mechanism in these controllers, makes our architecture more scalable because the timestamp size in T ι is independent of the number of audit tables. Nonetheless, as previously shown in Fig.1b , due to transitivity, there is a high possibility of having intermediate audit records (Eq.18), observed in T ι at the same p t time. This concurrency problem may lead to inconsistencies requiring controlled access to T ι by serialising the generation, collection and preservation of audit records [6] . Therefore, any intermediate audit record requiring to be timelined must 'wait' until any previously observed ones are recorded in T ι. Lastly, due to HLC implementation requirements, these databases are synchronised with an NTP-based time service every 15 min., and deployed as linked (or federated) database servers for enabling connectivity between N DB and F DB , and for remotely executing these controllers. In the following sections, the generation, collection and preservation of audit records through these controllers are explained in depth. 
Algorithm 1 Evidence Generation Controller

3) Evidence Preservation Controller:
This controller is composed of evidence preservation triggers and a particular stored procedure which also implements a HLC-based forensic mechanism for building the timeline T ι. These triggers execute the stored procedure every time the controller is notified of DML operations being generated in a table T i ∈ N DB , and collected in its corresponding audit table F i ∈ F DB . Therefore, following Alg.3, the resulting timeline T ι can be used later as an audit trail for explaining the causality of audit records, and the attribution of DML operations performed against N DB . As shown in Fig.4 , increased latency was expected in our HLC-based architecture when compared with its VC counterpart; mainly for two reasons (a) because it works in a distributed environment with two different database servers for transactional and forensic purposes each, and (b) due to inherent limitations when using linked (federated) communication that was mainly designed for data source merging between two servers [23] , and not for heavy transactional workload such as the one implemented in the controllers. Nonetheless, assuming an acceptable latency interval (up to 3.5 sec. per transaction), in Table I , almost 70 per cent of samples showed latency between 0.021 and 3.5 sec. when audit and forensic controls were enabled. This proves that our HLC-based architecture is
